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Abstract. Recently, Artemov [4] offered the notion of constructive consistency
for Peano Arithmetic and generalized it to constructive truth and falsity in the
spirit of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics and its formalization, the Logic
of Proofs. In this paper, we provide a complete description of constructive truth
and falsity for Friedman’s constant fragment of Peano Arithmetic. For this pur-
pose, we generalize the constructive falsity to n-constructive falsity where n is
any positive natural number. We also establish similar classification results for
constructive truth and n-constructive falsity of Friedman’s formulas. Then, we
discuss ‘extremely’ independent sentences in the sense that they are classically
true but neither constructively true nor n-constructive false for any n.
§1 Introduction.
In the second incompleteness theorem, Go¨del proved the impossibility to
prove an arithmetical sentence, Con(PA) = ∀x¬Proo f (x, 0 = 1), which is
meant to be a formalization of consistency of Peano Arithmetic, PA: For
all x, x is not a code of a proof of 0 = 1. The formalization is concerned
with arithmetization of the universal quantifier in the statement and the
arithmetization cannot rule out the interpretability of the quantifier to
range over both standard and nonstandard numbers. In a recent paper
[4], Artemov pointed out that it is too strong to capture fairly Hilbert’s
program on finitary consistency proof for arithmetic; it asked for a finitary
proof that in a formal arithmetic no finite sequence of formulas is a derivation of
a contradiction. Then, he proposed the notion of constructive consistency,
CCon(PA), and demonstrated that it is actually provable in PA.
Moreover, the generalization of constructive consistency was offered in
[4] in the spirit of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics and its
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formalization, the Logic of Proofs (LP): constructive falsitywith its counter-
part, the constructive truth. (On the family of systems called Justification
Logics including the Logic of Proofs, we can refer to [2, 3, 6, 7].)
Definition 1. 1 An arithmetical sentence A is constructively false if PA proves:
for any x, there is a proof that ‘x is not a proof of A’.
This is also viewed as the result of a refinement of the interpretation
of negation and implication in the BHK semantics by the framework of
the Logic of Proofs, which is compliant with the Kreisel ‘second clause’
criticism. (Cf. [7])
On the other hand, the letterless fragment of the logic of provability GL
has been an object of modal logical study of Peano Arithmetic, PA, since
Friedman’s 35th problem in [12]. A letterless sentence is one built up from
a constant for falsity ⊥, boolean connectives, and the modality . Boolos
[9], J. van Benthem, C. Bernardi and F. Montagna showed that there is a
specific normal form for these sentences and the fragment is decidable,
which was an answer to the Friedman’s question.
Following Boolos [11], we call the counterpart of letterless sentences in
PA constant sentences. Formally, they are built from the sentence 0 = 1,
a suitable provability predicate ProvPA(∗) and boolean connectives. Any
arithmetical interpretations convert a letterless sentence to the same con-
stant sentence in PA. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we write ⊥ to mean
0 = 1 and (∗) to mean a fixed provability predicate of PA.
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the constant fragment
of PA; in §2, we provide a complete delineation of the constant sentences
in terms of the notions of constructive tuth and falsity. Then, it turns
out natural to generalize constructive falsity to n-constructive falsity, for
each positive natural number n. Also, for each n, we provide classifica-
tion results for constructive truth and n-constructive falsity for constant
sentences.
The ‘constructive’ liar sentence was introduced and discussed in [4]
along with the Rosser sentence. In §3, we generalize both of these two
kinds of arithmetical sentences, and specify the logical status of them on
thebasis of generalized constructive falsity. Also,we clarifywhich constant
sentences can be the generalized Rosser sentences.
In §4, we offer the notion of ‘extreme’ independence from PA for arith-
metical sentences A: both they and their negation are neither provable in
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PA nor belong to n-constructive falsity for any n. We show that there is an
extremely independent arithmetical sentence but no constant sentence is
extremely independent.
§2 The Constant Fragment of Peano Arithmetic
In [4], Artemov clarified the status of some constant sentences on classical
and constructive truth and falsity: Con(PA) is classically true and construc-
tively false. 0 = 1 is classically false and constructively false. ¬Con(PA)
is classically false and neither constructively true nor constructively false.
Then, it is natural to ask a general question: under which condition a
constant sentence is said to be constructively true or constructively false.
First of all, wegeneralize thenotionof constructive falsity ton-constructive
falsity (n ≥ 1). Put c f n(F) = ∀xn¬(x : F) for each n ≥ 1, where n =
n
︷ ︸︸ ︷
 · · ·⊥.
Definition 2. 1 An arithmetical sentence A is n-constructive false if and only if
PA proves the sentence c f n(A).
The original constructive falsehood is the special case with n = 1.
Theorem 2. 2 (Normal Form Theorem) ⊢PA c f
n(F)↔ .F→ n⊥.
Proof. Work in PA. Suppose F, that is, ∃x(x : F) holds. Then, for some
y, we have y : F. By applyingΣ1-completeness n times, we obtain 
n(y : F).
On the other hand, suppose ∀xn¬(x : F). Then, n¬(y : F) holds. Hence,
we obtain n⊥. Thus, ∀xn¬(x : F)→ .F → n⊥. For the other direction,
obviously, n⊥ → n¬(x : F). By generalization, n⊥ → ∀xn¬(x : F).
On the other hand, by applying Σ1-completeness n times, for any x, ¬(x :
F) → n¬(x : F). By predicate calculus, ¬∃x(x : F) → ∀xn¬(x : F), that is,
¬F→ ∀xn¬(x : F). Therefore, ¬F ∨ n⊥. → ∀xn¬(x : F).
Here we observe some simple facts.
(F1) If A is n-constructively false and PA proves B → A, B is also n-
constructively false.
(F2) IfA is n-constructively false and n ≤ m, A ism-constructively false.
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(F3) If PA is n-consistent, that is, PA does not prove n⊥, then no n-
constructively false sentence is constructively true.
We say that a sentence is n-constructively false at the smallest if and only
if it is n-constructively false but notm-constructively false sentence for any
m < n.
We introduce the following three types of arithmetical sentences.
(α)-sentences: of the form n⊥ → m⊥ (0 ≤ n ≤ m)
(β, n)-sentences: of the form m⊥ → n−1⊥ (1 ≤ n ≤ m)
(γ, n)-sentences: of the form: n−1⊥ (1 ≤ n)
Lemma 2. 3 (1) (β, n)- and (γ, n)-sentences are n-constructively false at the
smallest.
(2) (α)-sentences are constructively true.
Proof. (2) is immediate. For (β, n)-sentences, consider the formula
(m⊥ → n−1⊥) → k⊥ with 0 ≤ n ≤ m. This is provably equivalent
in PA to n⊥ → k⊥. Therefore, PA proves it if and only if k ≥ n, in
terms of Go¨delean incompleteness theorems. The proof is similar for
(γ, n)-sentences.
By (βγ, n)-sentence wemean a conjunction of (β, a)- and (γ, b)-sentences
such that n is the minimum of all such a’s and b’s. In particular, when it
consists only of (β, a)-sentences, it is called a (β+, n) sentence.
Lemma 2. 4 (βγ, n)-sentences are n-constructively false at the smallest.
Proof. Temporarily, let (β, ni) and (γ,mi) denote a (β, ni)- and a (γ,mi)-
sentence, respectively. Consider the following sentence.
(*) (
∧
i(β, ni) ∧
∧
j(γ,m j))→ 
k⊥
where n = mini, j(ni,m j). By using derivability conditions on the prov-
ability predicate , this is provably equivalent in PA to the following.
∧
i (β, ni) ∧
∧
j (γ,m j)→ 
k⊥.
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Furthermore, we can execute the following transformations, keeping
equivalence in PA.
∧
i 
ni⊥ ∧
∧
j 
m j⊥ → k⊥;

n⊥ → k⊥.
Thus, in terms of Go¨delean incompleteness theorems, (∗) is provable in
PA if and only if k ≥ n.
Lemma 2. 5 Any constant sentence is provably in PA equivalent to an (α)-
sentence or a (βγ, n)-sentence for some n ≥ 1.
Proof. Boolos’ normal form theorem for constant sentences in [11] states
that any constant sentence is equivalent in PA to a boolean combination
of n⊥. By propositional transformation, it is further equivalent to a con-
junction of sentences of the form of (α), (β, n) and (γ,m). If it contains only
conjuncts which are (α)-sentences, it is equivalent to an (α)-sentence. Sup-
pose that it is of the form X ∧ Y where X contains no (α)-sentence and Y
contains only (α)-sentences. As X∧Y is equivalent in PA to X, it is a (βγ, n)
sentence with some n.
Theorem 2. 6 Any constant sentence is provably in PA equivalent to a construc-
tively true sentence or an n-consistently false sentence for some n.
Proof. Derived by Lemmas 2. 4, 2. 5.
Theorem 2. 7 Let A be any constant sentence and n be any positive natural
number. Suppose that PA is n-consistent. Then, we have the following.
(1) A is n-constructively false and classically true, if and only if, A is provably
in PA equivalent to a (β+,m)-sentence for some m ≤ n.
(2) A is n-constructively false and classically false, if and only if, A is provably
in PA equivalent to a (γ,m)-sentence for some m ≤ n.
(3) A is constructively true, if and only if, A is provably in PA equivalent to
an (α)-sentence.
Proof. The ‘if’ directions in (1-3) are immediate by Lemma 2. 4. For
the ‘only if’ direction. (3) is obvious. We prove (1, 2). Suppose that A is
m-constructively false at the smallest for some m ≤ n. By (F3), A is not
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constructively true and so, is not an (α)-sentence. Since A is constant, by
Lemma 2. 5,A is equivalent to a (βγ, a)-sentence for some a ≥ 1. By Lemma
2. 4, a = m.
Now, if it is classically true, A is equivalent to (β+,m)-sentence; if it is
classically false, A is equivalent to a conjunction of (γ,mi)-sentences where
mini(mi) = m, which is equivalent to a (γ,m)-sentence, that is, 
m−1⊥.
§3 Generalized ‘Constructive’LiarSentences and
Rosser Sentences
In [4], Artemov offered a constructive version, L, of ’Liar Sentence’ by
applying the diagonal lemma:
⊢PA L↔ ∀x¬(x : L)
↔ (L→ ⊥)
And he pointed out that L is classically true but neither constructively
true nor constructively false. We show that L is 2-constructively false and
¬L is (1-)constructively false.
We shall introduce a general version of ’Constructive Liar Sentence’.
For each n ≥ 1, Ln is provided by the following.
⊢PA Ln ↔ ∀x
n¬(x : Ln)
↔ (Ln → 
n⊥)
The existence of Ln, we call n-constructive liar, is guaranteed by the
diagonal lemma.
Theorem 3. 1 (1) Ln is classically true and (n + 1)-constructively false at the
smallest.
(2) ¬Lk is classically false and 1-constructively false. (k ≥ 1)
Proof. For (1). Suppose that Ln is not true. Then, Ln is not true and
Ln → 
n⊥ is true. This means Ln is true by definition of Ln. Hence, a
contradiction.
Next, again by definition, PA proves [Ln → (Ln → 
n⊥)] and so
Ln → 
n⊥. This means Ln is (n + 1)-constructively false. To show
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that (n + 1) is the smallest, suppose that PA proves Ln → 
n⊥, that is,
(Ln → 
n⊥) → n⊥. Then, PA also proves n⊥ → n⊥, which is
impossible in terms of Go¨delean incompleteness theorems.
The proof for (2) is similar.
How about Go¨delean Liar Sentence? It is considered to be Con(PA),
that is, ¬⊥. We can generalize this as follows: n-Go¨delean Liar Sentence,
or n-Liar Sentence is defined to be Con(PAn), which is well known to be
equivalent to ¬n⊥. 1 About this, we already know its status from the
result of the previous section. Con(PAn) is a (β, 1)-sentence and, by Lemma
2. 3, it is 1-constructively false at the smallest. As to ¬Con(PAn), it is
equivalent to n⊥, which is a (γ, n + 1)-sentence and, by Lemma 2. 3,
(n + 1)-constructively false at the smallest.
In [4], Artemov pointed out that the Rosser sentence, R, is classically
true and constructively false;¬R is classically false and constructively false.
Therefore, the result of Rosser’s incompleteness theorem is said to have
been the discovery of such a sentence which is 1-constructively false and
the negation of which is also 1-constructively false.
Here again, we can make a generalization: an arithmetical sentence Rn
is an n-Rosser sentence if both Rn and ¬Rn are n-constructively false at the
smallest (n ≥ 1). This condition is equivalent to the following: PA proves
¬k⊥ → (¬Rn ∧ ¬¬Rn)
for any k ≥ n and does not for any k < n. The original Rosser sentence R is
an instance of 1-Rosser sentence R1. It is well-konwn that such an Rn can
be constructed in PA.
Now, we can naturally ask: is it possible to construct constant n-Rosser
sentences?
Lemma 3. 2 Let A be any constant sentence containing the provability predicate
. If A is n-constructively false, ¬A is 1-constructively false.
Proof. If A is classically true, by Theorem 2. 7, ¬A is equivalent to the
form:
∨
i(
ki⊥∧¬ai⊥) where for each i, ai < n and ai < ki. Note that in PA,∨
i(
ki⊥ ∧ ¬ai⊥) implies ¬mini(ai)⊥. We have a derivation in PA:
1PAn is usually defined: PA0= PA; PAn+1 =PAn + Con(PAn)
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(
∨
i(
ki⊥ ∧ ¬ai⊥)) → (¬mini(ai)⊥)
→ (mini(ai)⊥ → ⊥)
→ (⊥ → ⊥)
→ ⊥
If A is classically false, by Theorem 2. 7, ¬A is equivalent to the form:
¬a⊥ with a < n. By the hypothesis, a , 0. We have a derivation in PA:
¬a⊥ → (a⊥ → ⊥)
→ (⊥ → ⊥)
→ ⊥
Thus, in any case, ¬A is 1-constructively false.
Theorem 3. 3 LetAbe any constant sentence containing the provability predicate
. Then, the following are equivalent.
(1) A is an n-Rosser sentence for some n;
(2) A is a 1-Rosser sentence;
(3) A is 1-constructively false.
Proof. Proofs from (2) to (1) and from (2) to (3) are immediate.
From (1) to (2): If (1) holds, both A and ¬A are both n-constructively
false and, by Lemma 3. 2, n = 1.
From (3) to (2): If (3) holds, by Lemma 3. 2, ¬A is 1-constructively false.
Then, (2) holds.
By Theorem 3. 3, constant sentences can be n-Rosser sentences only
when n = 1. Of course, we can weaken the definition of n-Rosser sen-
tences: Rn is a weak n-Rosser sentence if and only if both Rn and ¬Rn are
n-constructively false (not necessarily at the smallest).
Corollary 3. 4 Any constant sentence containing the provability predicate  is
a weak n-Rosser sentence for some n, unless it is constructively true.
Proof. For any constant sentence A containing , if A is not construc-
tively true, by Theorem 2. 6, A is n-constructively false for some n ≥ 1. By
Lemma 3. 2, ¬A is 1-constructively, therefore, n-constructively false.
Also, we obtain a relationship bewtween n-constructive liar sentences
and n-Rosser sentences.
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Corollary 3. 5 (1) No one of constructive liar sentences and the negation of them
is an n-Rosser sentence for any n.
(2) For any n ≥ 1, any n-constructive liar sentence Ln is a weak (n+1)-Rosser
sentence.
Proof. Derived by Theorem 3. 1.
Here is a table to sum up some of the results from §§2, 3.
Classically True Classically False
...
...
...
n-const. false Ln−1, Rn

m⊥ → n−1⊥ (m ≥ n) n−1⊥
...
...
...
3-const. false L2, R3

m⊥ → 2⊥ (m ≥ 3) 2⊥
2-const. false L1, R2

m⊥ → 1⊥ (m ≥ 2) ⊥
R1 ¬Li, ¬Ri (1 ≤ i)
1-const. false ¬m⊥ (m ≥ 1) m⊥ ∧ ¬n−1⊥ (m ≥ n ≥ 2)
⊥
§4 ‘Extremely’ Independent Sentences
We showed that any constant sentence is n-constructively false for some
n, unless it is constructively true (Theorem 2. 6). This implies that well-
known constant Go¨delean sentences such as Con(PAn) and ¬Con(PAn) are
m-constructively false for some m.
How about the ‘Reflection Principles’? For any sentence A, let Re f (A)
denote A → A (what we call the local Reflection Principle for A). We
claim the following.
Theorem 4. 1 For any sentence A, ¬Re f (A) is 2-constructively false.
Proof. In PA, we have the following derivation.
(A ∧ ¬A)→ A ∧ ¬A
→ A ∧ ¬A
→ ⊥
This finishes the proof.
We note that the above argument does not generally hold for what we
call the uniform Reflection Principle.
In addition, it is known that Re f (AΠ1) for Π1-sentences A
Π1 is provably
equivalent to Con(PA) in PA. Hence, Re f (AΠ1) is 1-constructively false and
¬Re f (AΠ1) is 2-constructive false.
These results raise the question of the status of independence of a
kind of Go¨delean sentences (such as Con(PA), Re f (A), and other constant
ones) from PA. So, we can naturally ask if there is a ’truly’ independent
arithmetical sentence from PA or not. We consider stronger notions of
independence.
Definition 4. 2 1. An arithmetical sentence A is strongly independent from
PA if and only if A is neither constructively true nor n-constructively false for
any n.
2. An arithmetical sentence A is extremely independent from PA if and
only if both A and ¬A are strongly independent from PA.
Note that if a sentence A is extremely independent, so is ¬A.
Theorem 4. 3 No instance of the local Reflection Principle is extremely indepen-
dent from PA.
Proof. Derived by Theorem 4. 1.
Theorem 4. 4 No arithmetical constant sentence is strongly nor extremely inde-
pendent from PA.
Proof. Derived by Theorem 2. 6.
In [4], Artemov showed that there is an arithmetical sentence A such
that both A and ¬A are not 1-constructively false by using the uniform
arithmetical completeness for the modal logic GL. We extend this result to
our general setting.
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Proposition 4. 5 (UniformArithmetical Completeness forGL) There is an arith-
metical interpretation ∗ such that for any formula A of modal logic, ⊢GL A iff
⊢PA A
∗.
This was established independently in [1, 8, 10, 13, 14].
Theorem 4. 6 There is an extremely independent sentence.
Proof. Fix a propositional variable p. It is easily seen that for any
positive natural number n, 0GL p → 
n⊥ and 0GL ¬p → 
n⊥. (This
can be proved by an argument of Kripke completemess or the arithmetical
completeness for GL.) Therefore, by the above proposition, there is an
arithmetical sentence F such that for any positive natural number n, 0PA
F→ n⊥ and 0PA ¬F→ 
n⊥. This sentence F is extremely independent
from PA.
Corollary 4. 7 There is an instance of the local Reflection Principle which is
strongly independent from PA.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 4. 6, we obtain the sentence F such
that for any positive natural number n, 0PA F → 
n⊥. This sentence
is equivalent to (F → F) → n⊥. Therefore, Re f (F) = F → F is the
desired instance.
Theorem 4. 4 could signify a limitation of the expressibility of arith-
metical constant sentences, as contrasted with Theorem 4. 6.
§5 Concluding Remark
In this paper, we reported some results on the notion of constructive truth
and falsity in PA, which was just invented and has been reported to offer
a ‘real’ solution to the Hilbert program in Artemov [4]. In particular,
we showed some theorems on the relationship of those notions and the
‘constant’ fragment of PA, which has been actively studied a lot since
Friedman [12].
As is easily observed, an arithmetical sentence is n-constructively false
if and only if its unprovability in PA is provable in PA plus Con(PAn). As
an extension of the work of this paper, a natural research problem would
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be to examine whether or not things change in an essential way, if we are
permitted to talk about extensions of PA in the well-known ‘transfinite
progression’ since Turing. Then, we have the notion of α-constructive
falsity, where α is an ordinal in an ordinal system. As the research subject
of the transfinite progression is known to form a vast area of mathematical
logic, we report this further study in a separate paper.
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